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ABSTRACT
Empirical findings demonstrate that neuroscientific expertise is increasingly prevalent in
courtrooms. This suggests that both “territorial conflicts” between law and neuroscience—-
for example about how to conceptualize concepts like culpability—and questions regarding
the integration of neuroscience and law, which both have long been present in theoretical
discussions, are now finding their way to legal practice. As jurisdictions around the globe
differ on multiple dimensions (e.g., on how concepts like culpability are conceptualized,
embedded in legal doctrine, and how integration of neuroscience takes place within (pro-
cedural) legal frameworks) analyses on a national level are needed next to universal endeav-
ors. In this article, the Dutch situation will be addressed. First, we will assess whether the
theoretical notions underlying Dutch criminal law are compatible with the theoretical dis-
cussion between neuroscience and legal doctrine. Second, we turn to empirical evidence as
to the way neuroscientific information is brought into Dutch legal practice. Finally, we will
examine how (well) the current practice of forensic assessment is able to accommodate
neuroscientific information. Herewith, we aim to illustrate that the manner of integration is
indeed dependent on jurisdiction specific features and that the international debate would





Introduction: Neuroscience and Dutch
criminal justice
In many jurisdictions, including the Netherlands (De
Kogel & Westgeest, 2015), the frequency with which
neuroscientific information is brought up in criminal
courts is increasing. While neuropsychological test
results have long been part of forensic behavioral
expertise, it now progressively also involves brain-
scans, neurological, -toxicological, -genetic, or other,
also less individualized, neuroscientific expertise. The
apparent increase in practical legal relevance suggests
that the discussions which have long been present in
scientific literature, are finding their way to legal prac-
tice. Some of these have a potentially disjointing
import, as some neuroscientists have been attacking
the criminal justice dogma, claiming that it is based
on an outdated image of human functioning and now
falsified notions such as responsibility and guilt.
However, the arisen area of scientific inquiry into the
meaning and implications of neuroscience for the law
and related practices—"neurolaw” (Meynen,
2016)—aims for a larger part on integration of the
disciplines through revision of law, legal, and assess-
ment practice or interventions from a neuroscientific
perspective.
One of the mentioned obstacles for integration of
the disciplines is the lack of a “lingua franca” or a
coherent framework for linking legal standards refer-
encing mental function to specific, quantifiable cogni-
tive processes (Buckholtz & Faigman, 2014).
Moreover, while neurosciences may speak a universal
language, (criminal) law does not. Jurisdictions
around the globe differ in the way they conceptualize
relevant aspects of substantive law, as for example cul-
pability—probably the most prominent concept that
neuroscientists seem to claim as expertise—as well as
in matters of procedural law: meaning provisions con-
cerning acquiring, admitting and evaluating neuro-
scientific expertise. Therefore, inquiries on jurisdiction
CONTACT Michiel J. F. van der Wolf vanderwolf@law.eur.nl Erasmus University Rotterdam, Department of Criminal Law, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50,
PO Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands
 2019 International Association of Forensic Mental Health Services
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH
2019, VOL. 18, NO. 3, 281–291
https://doi.org/10.1080/14999013.2018.1525778
specific discussions on the integration of criminal law
and neuroscience are needed next to more univer-
sal endeavors.
In this aritcle, we will start this endeavor by adress-
ing the Dutch situation. The choice for the Dutch
situation is not merely one of acquaintance. Especially
the Dutch “degrees” of diminished responsibility have
been mentioned in international literature as possibly
compatible with one of the promises of the advance-
ments of neuroscience for criminal law: conceptualiz-
ing the responsibility doctrine more broadly than it is
today, includes defining responsibility more as a
dimensional than a categorical construct (Glenn &
Raine, 2014). The chosen approach therefore also
allows for testing whether the Dutch situation is pos-
sibly not only an example in the descriptive sense, but
also in an appraising one. In recognizing that the out-
comes of a universal debate differ depending on juris-
dictional specificities lies the added value of the
narrow approach for an international audience.
Therefore, as the focus explains why most references
are made to the Dutch scholarly discussion, at critical
issues references are made to the underlying inter-
national debate. Similarly, on a few key characteristics,
the international reader will be aided in legal compari-
son through contrasting the Dutch civil law frame-
work with those in common law jurisdictions.
In what follows, we will first assess whether the
dogmatic foundations of Dutch criminal law are
affected by the mentioned theoretical discussion
between neuroscience and legal doctrine. Second, we
will turn to empirical evidence as to the way neuro-
scientific information is brought into Dutch legal
practice. And third, we will examine how (well) the
current practice of forensic assessment is able to
accommodate neuroscientific information.
Theoretical discussions about neuroscience
versus criminal justice
It is now generally accepted that the human brain
works according to applicable laws of nature, in the
sense that we assume that—in theory—a physical pro-
cess exists for every instance of knowing, wanting or
feeling. Recent discoveries have convinced some scien-
tists that “free will” is an illusion. It should be pointed
out at the outset of this article that here already
appears to be an essential difference between the neu-
rosciences and the criminal justice method, since the
smallest level of analysis in criminal justice is the per-
son with legal rights and obligations, not their organs
or neurons. Reference is made in this context to a
pitfall that neuroscientists fall into: the Mereological
fallacy. This fallacy arises when a part (for example,
the brain) is considered responsible for something
that can only be considered responsible when it is
whole (for example, person with legal rights) (Pardo
& Patterson, 2010). Nevertheless, in the past few years
it has become apparent that casting doubt on “free
will” must be discussed by and within criminal law
studies. Since in most jurisdictions criminal liability is
founded on both harm (actus reus) and fault (mens
rea), the latter includes establishing the extent to
which culpability can be attributed to a person and at
a first glance it seems difficult to perform this task
when a “free will” is absent.
It is standard in the debate about the relationship
of modern neuroscience findings on free will to dis-
tinguish three positions: hard determinism, libertar-
ianism (also called “indeterminism”) and
compatibilism (e.g., Roskies, 2006; Meynen, 2014).
Hard determinists believe that free will is not compat-
ible with neuroscientific insights and prefer neurosci-
ence to free will. In their view, as the Dutch
neuroscientist Victor Lamme (2008) expressed it, it
can be concluded that free will “does not exist.” The
libertarians likewise do not believe in the possibility of
aligning neuroscientific findings with the existence of
free will, but they choose free will as the only valid
explanation of human behavior. Compatibilism strives
for a compromise: accepting the natural science
mechanics of the brain but believing that this is com-
patible with the existence of free will or at least
ascribing responsibility. This last position, which cur-
rently seems to have the most adherents, has elabo-
rated several different versions of what such a
compromise would look like exactly (e.g., Roskies,
2006; Meynen 2014).
At first glance, one could wonder if there is any-
thing new under the sun. For example, during the
turn of the 20th century, especially in continental
Europe, the Modern Direction within criminal law
already presented on scientific, in contrast to earlier
philosophical or religious, viewpoints that man was
more or less forced to be determined (Roef, 2013).
However, while in that debate the emphasis lay pri-
marily on verifying the alternative explanations, e.g.,
biological or social, for our deeds, nowadays—sup-
ported by the alleged “hardness” of the new scien-
ce—it is attempted to falsify free choice by claiming
that our consciousness does not control our behavior.
This last element contains the renewed arguments of
the neurosciences.
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Intuitively, it seems obvious to assume that people
are capable of influencing their actions through their
consciousness; we do experience that our conscious-
ness precedes our actions. However, on the basis of
several experiments and case reports, this order has
been reversed by some neuroscientists. Decisions to
carry out a certain action are apparently evident in
our brain before we are conscious of them, as Libet
first demonstrated through a readiness potential with
an EEG in a decision task experiment (Libet, Gleason,
Wright, & Peral, 1983; Libet, 1985). The conclusion is
that decisions are taken by neurological processes that
are independent of consciousness. The function of our
consciousness in this view is nothing more than a
‘chatter box’ that subsequently invents rationalizations
for our behavior (Lamme, 2008). Consciousness is
“impotent in a causal sense” according to neuroscient-
ists who adhere to this theory (De Jong, 2013). These
findings are crucial because modern ideas about free
will align with our ability to act in accordance with
our deeper consciousness. It is self-evident that such a
proposition is problematic for criminal law matters
because it is vital for the attribution of criminal culp-
ability to assume that people can be held responsible
for their behavior, or at least can decide not to act on
undesirable behavior (Hart, 2007). Much has been
written in the literature about how to respond to this
“attack (cf. Gordon & Fondacaro, 2018).
Three directions can roughly be distinguished.
First, disputing aforementioned neuroscientific find-
ings with its own weapons, by challenging the validity
of the research methods employed or the conclusions
drawn. A second direction relieves the tension by
defining the neuroscientific discourse and the criminal
justice method as incompatible paradigms, which are
not dependent on each other for their right to exist. A
final direction of thought accepts that these neuro-
scientific findings have achieved the definitive triumph
for hard determinism and concludes that the newly
accepted reality requires a reform of criminal justice
systems at a fundamental level. These three positions
are described in more detail below.
Substantial criticism is aimed partly at the research
methods used: the experiments the neuroscientists
present as evidence of the concept that our conscious-
ness does not guide our behavior are so far removed
from the normal reality that it is not possible to
extrapolate the conclusion that it is always so (Van
Marle, Koenraadt, & Weijers, 2009). Sie and Wouters,
(2010) make an analogy with experiments in which
subjects experience a deliberately staged optical illu-
sion. In their opinion, this shows that the way in
which we process visual information can be misled by
a clever experiment, but does not confirm that our
system for visual information processing does not
work in general. A second criticism digs deeper and
proposes that the moral responsibility of people who
have committed a crime should not be based on their
thoughts shortly before the offense. The reasoning is
that if people act on automatic pilot, as some neuro-
scientists conclude from their research, and our
explanations for our behavior are no more than post
hoc rationalizations, this does not necessarily mean
that people cannot be held morally responsible for
their actions. Sie and Wouters (2010) build on the
above-mentioned metaphor when they write that such
a finding still does not negate the argument that peo-
ple with their free will are capable of programing their
automatic pilot. Finally, it has been added that the
conclusions drawn by some neuroscientists about free
will are too rigid. A holistic view, in which the brain
is not understood as a collection of parts, each with
its own isolated function, but as a system with the
whole being more than the sum of the parts due to
the continuous interactions between them, seems to
have recently triumphed in the field of neuroscience.
This “connectionist” approach offers an explanation
for the observed “plasticity” of the brain—the continu-
ous changing of its functional anatomy—and offsets
the idea that certain traits are permanently preprog-
ramed in our brain (with regards to psychopathic
behavior; see the reviews of Koenigs, Baskin-
Sommers, Zeier, & Newman, 2011; and Brazil, van
Dongen, Maes, Mars, & Baskin-Sommers, 2016).
Psychological processes could then precede in a causal
way the neurological processes (that lead to action), as
even environmental factors can influence the forma-
tion of new connections in the nervous system
(Kandel, 2008). It can be deduced from other import-
ant objections that the conclusion of the total absence
of freedom of choice cannot be based on the findings
of Libet and successors. First of all, because they show
that while we do not initiate an action consciously, we
can stop it. Libet spoke of a “free won’t” instead of a
“free will,” which does allow some freedom of choice
(Libet, 1993). Second, according to some people, it is
an example of the previously mentioned “mereological
fallacy,” identifying the brain function of conscious-
ness with the person as the source of freedom
of choice.
Next to trying to falsify the neuroscientific claim of
the nonexistence of free choice, another way to parry
the neuroscientific insights from the criminal law is to
label them as incompatible paradigms and claiming
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law to be immune to attacks based on neuroscientific
findings. Dutch Supreme Court justice Buruma (2008,
2011, 2013) seems to define the legal paradigm as he
talks about the “social functionality” of criminal law,
meaning that it is mainly essential to keep society in
order. Similarly, Roef (2013) states that the alleged
free will in criminal law must not be considered an
empirically verifiable natural phenomenon but a social
construction that—in brief—enables an orderly social
cohabitation. Neuroscience and criminal law are thus
considered two different paradigms with no possibility
of sensible communication between them. From a
legal philosophical perspective, the Kantian distinction
between theoretical and intersubjective reason is help-
ful in such an argumentation; it is claimed that the
neuroscientists frame the debate incorrectly in terms
of theoretical reason—or pretend that determining
“free will” is an objective empirical mater. The con-
cept belongs in this Kantian view to the domain of
practical reason and must therefore be considered a
concept with an intersubjective meaning (Mackor,
2010). We practice free will in our daily lives and as
such it is inconceivable that it is not there. “Reactive
attitudes”—such as feelings of gratitude and outra-
ge—are essential in interpersonal relationships accord-
ing to Strawson (2008), as he postulates that human
contact can simply not do without the possibility of
holding each other responsible for one’s deeds. He
asserts that the suggestion of a completely anomic
society in which such notions would no longer play a
role is absurd. Expanding on this, the legitimation of
everyone’s criminal law responsibility could be
accepted by considering the criminal justice system as
the institutionalized conclusion of this necessary social
order. Concluding that there are two irreconcilable
paradigms, does not have to be the end of this line of
thought; indeed, on the basis of these arguments it
can also be concluded that neuroscientists are wrong
when they choose a reductionist, objectifying view
which ignores the essentially intersubjective which
permeates human interactions.
Finally, it is of course also possible not to dispute
the claims of the deterministic neuroscientists but to
accept them and use them as the starting point for a
new type of criminal justice system. This is what
some neuroscientists propose themselves, despite the
criticism of entering a field they are not experts in.
Well-known advocates of this option are the
American psychologists Greene and Cohen (2004),
who argue in an article with the revealing title, For
the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything,
for redesigning the fundamental principles of the
criminal justice system. In this view, a retributive basis
of criminal law is dismissed because it is accepted that
notions such as culpability and intent have been
revealed to be non-existent illusions. This does not
mean that the entire structure of criminal law must be
demolished; Greene and Cohen are looking for a new,
utilitarian foundation. This will lead to a new type of
future-oriented criminal law based on the laws of
determinism. If we understand Greene and Cohen
correctly, this means that a distinction ought to be
made between people who are and people who are
not sensitive to the deterrent effect of a threat of pun-
ishment. For people who are sensitive, but neverthe-
less committed a crime, the “punishment” could be
maintained. People who are not sensitive to a criminal
justice deterrent, and Greene and Cohen include at
least those of unsound mind and juveniles here, would
not be considered for punishment.
Despite the outward appearance of a novelty, the
last presented view is almost identical to that of the
mentioned Modern Direction in criminal law theory
of about a century ago. Dutch criminal law has been
greatly influenced by this deterministic movement, as
was the case in other mainly continental European
jurisdictions. In that time, separate tracks within crim-
inal justice have arisen for specific groups—in short:
offenders that, because of, e.g., a mental disorder,
underdevelopment, or addiction are considered to be
at a high risk of reoffending—with distinct sanctions
(“measures”) that are not retrospective (retributive) in
nature but prospective (preventative). The Dutch
entrustment order (tbs), entailing detention and treat-
ment in a high security forensic mental hospital, and
the associated regulation can be considered classic
examples of the compromise between the retributivist
oriented Classical Direction, and the—by deterministic
revelations sparked—Modern Direction (Van der
Landen, 1992; Van der Wolf, 2012). The most import-
ant advocate of the Modern Direction in the
Netherlands was the criminal law scholar G. A. van
Hamel (1906), who proposed distinguishing groups of
“subject to punishment,” “open to improvement,” and
“incorrigible.” The sanction for the last-mentioned
group was rendering them harmless, which produced
massive criticism at the time because it led for
example to arguments for the mandatory castration of
sexual offenders (Van der Meer, 2008) and reintro-
duction of the death penalty (De Roos, 1900) apart
from elimination through lengthy detention. The pos-
sibility of exceeding ethical boundaries by exceeding
the limits of proportionality, which is indicated in
classical thought by the extent of culpability, is the
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familiar dogmatic criticism of such sanctions on the
basis of risk. The tbs-order has been dealing with this
for a century already.
However, already in the discussions leading up to
enactment of the order in 1928, the criticism was
expressed that no reliable distinction in a diagnostic
sense of the specified groups could be made (van
Hamel, 1912). And a final criticism on not sanction-
ing guilt but risk is that a denial of responsibility
sends a rather unsettling message to society—separate
from the issue of whether society would accept it
from the viewpoint of granting justice to the victims.
Erasmus for example felt, as early as his salvation
theological discussion with Luther about predestin-
ation that the denial of free will by his opponent
would lead to people no longer exerting themselves to
do “good deeds” (Van der Wolf, 2006). Social scien-
tific research seems to confirm this. In an experiment
in which people first read about the nonexistence of
free will, it seemed that they cheated by copying, took
more money as a reward, were more aggressive and
less inclined to help others than the group that had
not read the text (Vohs & Schooler, 2008).
As such the Dutch came up with a compromise on
the theoretical level to ensure on the practical level
that society could be granted maximum safety from
dangerous individuals through the tbs-order. The con-
cept of diminished responsibility plays a pivotal role
in this compromise. Classical theorists only accepted
the distinction between penalties and safety-measures
for groups which could not be held fully responsible.
Their mental disorder (or underdevelopment for
minors) only partly determines the commission of the
offense. For that psychopathological part which makes
them dangerous they may receive a preventative
order, but for the part that they are still responsible
they should receive a penalty in addition. The order
of execution is such that possibly after a (prison) sen-
tence, detention in a tbs-clinic will follow. Indeed, this
has turned out to be a dogmatic demand with severe
practical consequences, among which the deterioration
of the disorder during a lengthy prison sentence ren-
dering the subsequent treatment an even more daunt-
ing task. For the classical theorists the downside was
that the modernists demanded that the term “dimin-
ished responsibility” would not be mentioned in the
legislation. So now for imposition of a tbs-order only
the presence of a disorder at the time of the crime—-
not necessarily a causal connection—is required.
Because of this, it has been argued that Dutch crim-
inal justice could dismiss diminished responsibility
(Bijlsma & Meynen, 2017), but that would not do any
justice to the central role of the doctrine in the com-
ing about of the tbs-order. Nor to the fact that Dutch
criminal law has a long history, dating back to at least
1804, of recognizing criminal responsibility as a
dimensional concept.
Not only the nuanced responsibility doctrine sepa-
rates the Dutch framework for culpability from that
used in Anglo-American common law jurisdictions.
In the Netherlands “mens rea” is acknowledged to
have both a descriptive meaning—the fault element of
an offense, for example intent—and a normative
meaning—blameworthiness. In this system “insan-
ity”—or the lack of criminal responsibility due to a
mental disorder—is seen as an excuse negating the
blameworthiness of the offense. Through this system
it can easily be explained that insanity does not gener-
ally lead to a complete lack of mens rea, as for
example the element of “intent” can usually still be
fulfilled: mentally disordered can act intentional yet
not be blameworthy (Keiler & Roef, 2015). The fact
that it is more of a normative concept than a descrip-
tion of impaired cognition or capability allows judges
for more leeway to incorporate all sorts of relevant
arguments into the act of establishing the degree of
responsibility—including for example the consequen-
ces for sanctioning. Theoretically, both the normative
and the dimensional character of the criminal respon-
sibility doctrine seem to render it open towards inte-
grating neuroscientific information.
The use of neuroscientific information in
criminal courts
In the following, we shall focus on the Dutch criminal
law practice to examine whether an empirical view on
legal practice actually indicates that the criminal
responsibility doctrine is especially sensitive toward
neuroscientific information. While in the theoretical
discussion primarily general starting points were cast
into doubt, neuroscientific information in concrete
criminal cases is involved in determining specific devi-
ations of normal brain functioning: by using scans and
other forms of brain examination, an attempt is made
to define the extent to which someone deviates from
the standard “normal.” Allied to the transition from
the general to the specific, is that in legal practice
neuroscientific findings no longer seem potentially
undermining, but instead providing a supportive func-
tion in answering legal issues in concrete cases.
As the Dutch criminal responsibility concept is
based on the relationship between the offense and a
mental disorder, diminished responsibility may be
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based on the presence of a mental, psychotic, or even
personality disorder at the time of the crime. In com-
mon law jurisdictions a personality disorder is gener-
ally not associated with the insanity defense (e.g.,
Palermo, 2010). Diminished responsibility usually acts
by mitigating the punishment and also makes it pos-
sible to impose additional sanctions on the suspect,
such as the mentioned tbs-order, often to be executed
after the termination of a detention period. A decision
of non-responsibility excludes punishment, but ren-
ders the tbs-order applicable in cases of high risk for
recidivism and a conviction for a serious crime.
Judges are advised by behavioral scientists when it
seems likely that there is a case for diminished crim-
inal responsibility, but this does not affect the fact
that it is not a purely behavioral science judgment but
in essence a normative judgment. This can be illus-
trated by the situation in which someone under the
influence of alcohol commits a crime; behavioral sci-
entists will probably agree that the person did not
know what he was doing, but the judge is unlikely to
be persuaded to have compassion with him. The issue
of criminal responsibility will not soon play a role in
such a context as a conscious decision of taking the
alcohol precedes the consequences of the intoxication
and therefore someone will be deemed to have “culpa
in causa” or prior fault.
The Dutch criminal law proceedings also work
with a mandatory (dichotomic: yes/no) decision tree,
and the issue of responsibility in the order of this
scheme is one of the last questions to be considered
by the judge. First s/he has to declare the offense pro-
ven, including the subjective components from the
description of the offense (the descriptive part of
mens rea). In practice, this mostly concerns “intent,”
in a few cases a lighter form of culpability (“culpa”),
and in a very limited number of cases the factor for
increasing the penalty, “premeditation,” may be
required. Because of this order, if the subjective com-
ponents required for the offense cannot be proven out
of the facts and circumstances, the issue of criminal
responsibility will never be addressed.
Although the aforementioned subjective compo-
nents may seem at first glance useful for formulating
the behavioral problem, they are traditionally only
used incidentally to formulate the problem with the
aid of behavioral arguments. The current dogmatic
consensus prescribes—partly as a result of the inter-
pretation by the Dutch Supreme Court—that for
assessing these subjective components, judges should
abstract to a large extent from the individual charac-
teristics of the culprit and judge on the basis of
generalized, phenomenological conceptions of intent,
guilt, or premeditation. Because the modern neuro-
scientific insights provide new ammunition, however,
it is in theory conceivable that their introduction
would lead to a change in the way these legal ques-
tions are answered. In earlier Dutch literature, it was
suggested that neuroscientific information could hin-
der the proving of intent or premeditation, which
would mean a break with the past (Haseleger, Leoné,
& Van Toor, 2013). That would mean that neuro-
scientific information would than already be used for
proving the offense, instead of determining the crim-
inal responsibility.
To test these hypotheses we turn to the empirical
evidence from a database of the Scientific Research
and Documentation Centre (WODC) of the Ministry
of Justice and Security of cases in which neurobio-
logical or genetic information was introduced (De
Kogel & Westgeest, 2015). The number of times that
neuroscientific information was discussed considering
the proof (of) absence intent (N = 20) or culpa
(N = 14) was low. Premeditation was discussed just
twice. Altogether, the influence of neuroscientific
information on the answering of these legal questions
seems not revolutionary in practice.
Expanding on this WODC study, we have reviewed
the rare judgments in which there was a discussion
about intent or culpa which was examined further on
the basis of neuroscientific information. The input
here seems to remain focused on a deviation from the
normal condition (sleepwalking, blood circulatory dis-
turbance)—just like with the question of criminal
responsibility—and therefore definitely not on the
denial of intent or culpa in an apparently “normal”
psychological configuration. With “normal” suspects,
the criminal practice is satisfied in general with the
experience of terms such as wanting and knowing to
ascertain the subjective components, a phenomeno-
logical view that by definition is not interested in neu-
ronaturalism. The Supreme Court has set a separate
standard for intent in the case of a severe mental dis-
order; only a defendant who has lost all insight in the
scope of his actions and its consequences would act
unintentional. This criterion is rarely met and only in
cases of dissociative disorders. Psychotic offenders for
example are therefore generally seen as acting inten-
tional. Culpa is more normative in character; there
was no knowledge but ought to have been—rendering
this doctrine practically immune to a certain extent
against modern neuroscientific insights, which always
aim at the relevance of consciousness shortly before
the offense. The almost total lack of attention paid to
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premeditation in legal practice can be surprising at
first glance as the modern neuroscientific insights
especially focus on discussing the relevance of con-
sciousness shortly before the crime is committed.
However, this leads in fact to the doctrine itself being
put to discussion, with it appearing obvious to con-
duct this discussion in a general sense rather than in
a concrete case, considering the very small number of
crimes for which premeditation is a component.
Neither the WODC study nor our subsequent
review of the relevant judgements leads to the impres-
sion that a watershed has been reached with the intro-
duction of neuroscientific information in criminal
courts. Indeed, such information is by far most often
used in determining the criminal responsibility and
therefore the individual defendant’s culpability
(N = 72), based on the question of whether there was
“a lack of development or pathological disorder of the
mental faculties” (the legal criterion for disorder)
which caused the offense (in part). These findings are
somewhat in line with American findings on case law
with regards to neuroimaging evidence. Courts were
not willing to allow it (unlike civil law jurisdictions
like the Netherlands, most common law jurisdictions
assessment of expert evidence do not gravitate
towards an ex post appraisal, including provisions for
motivating the use of this evidence, but instead pro-
vide ex ante admissibility provisions), to negate for
example ‘intent’ at the guilt phase, but were—if the
evidence was allowed and found relevant—sometimes
willing to mitigate the sentence, for example from a
death sentence to a prison sentence (Edersheim,
Brendel, & Price, 2012). Contrast with the Dutch find-
ings is that in the Netherlands other than in most
jurisdictions, mitigation of the sentence is explicitly
linked to the criminal responsibility doctrine, also
allowing neuroscientific information to affect a deci-
sion of the absence of guilt in the sense of blame-
worthiness. Second, a Dutch finding of diminished
responsibility does not only lead to mitigation of the
sentence, but also to the possibility of imposing a pre-
ventative treatment order, like the tbs.
Looking at the whole, it seems that despite the fact
that the quantity of neuroscientific information in
court cases has increased, little has actually changed.
The fundamental issues about assigning intent and
guilt which have led to interesting discussions at the
theoretical level are ignored in the Dutch legal prac-
tice of the law for now. Even if the growing insight
into the working of our brain eventually leads to
more detailed advice about the extent of guilt or
accountability of defendants, this can be incorporated
without difficulty in the current system. The main dif-
ference from the past may be that among the experts
called upon, there will more often be a neuroscientist
instead of a psychologist or psychiatrist. The input of
neuroscientific information will come with new chal-
lenges for both neuroscientists and legal scholars. We
shall return to this point in the next section.
Interpretation of neuroscientific information in
forensic assessment
Neuroscientific knowledge was quickly acknowledged
to be very reliable. It was soon assumed that the
“robust” knowledge had a similar strength to DNA or
fingerprints (Jelicic & Merckelbach, 2007). The Royal
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (2011)
stated in the Wetenschapsagenda KNAW 2011 that the
neurosciences produced “hard” knowledge. Various
authors warned, however, that the hardness of neuro-
science was often overestimated (Jelicic &
Merckelbach, 2007; Van Marle, 2009; Rassin, 2012).
That is why we are discussing in this last section how
the interpretation of neuroscientific information is
and should be incorporated in the forensic assessment
of criminal responsibility in the Netherlands.
A part of the neuroscientific body of research aims
at establishing the correlations between certain aberra-
tions in the anatomy of the brain and delinquent
behavior. The fact that neuroscientists claim to be
able to identify pedophilia with 95% certainty in the
brain (Ponseti, Granert, & Jansen, 2012) does not
have criminal relevance now as such feelings and
thoughts can lead to criminal acts but most of the
time they do not. This applies likewise to the link
between small amygdalae and psychopathic behavior
(Haseleger et al., 2013), now that references are
increasingly being made to psychopathic characteris-
tics being useful, or at least accepted, in the top ech-
elon of business (“snakes in suits” according to Hare
& Babiak, 2006), but still callous and unemotional. An
important subsequent qualification of such findings at
group level is that they do not justify making state-
ments about individuals. This is called the group-to-
individual (G2i) problem, which is of course related
to the differences in paradigm between neuroscience
and law as described in section 2. In other words, we
cannot say that a person with a small amygdala is a
psychopath (Schleim & Rosier, 2009). In addition,
such findings are often not unequivocal. For example,
a small frontal cortex is related to violent behavior,
whereas a large frontal cortex is associated with white-
collar criminality (Glenn & Raine, 2014). This shows
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that it is not possible to make predictions for a person
about the relevance in criminal law of the anatomy of
his brain without the input of other knowledge. If we
know that someone has a predisposition to violent
behavior or is known to have committed white-collar
crimes in the past, we can try to make a sensible link
to the state of his frontal cortex, and from there pos-
sibly enhance assessments about future risk and/or
sensible remedies. Neuroscientific information consid-
ered in isolation is therefore not that informative; it
gains meaning when embedded in more comprehen-
sive knowledge about a person’s personality or
psychopathology.
Other neuroscientific research focusses on brain
functions. The best-known instrument is the fMRI
(functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) scan. The
use of such scans is associated with the necessary
uncertainty, however. The important point to know is
that fMRI scans measure brain activity by the perfu-
sion of brain regions. It is assumed that increased per-
fusion implies a higher activity of that part of the
brain. It is also possible, however, that increased per-
fusion is a symptom of less efficient oxygen consump-
tion of the region in question, or that the activity
consists of inhibiting another region of the brain
(Schleim & Rosier, 2009; Haseleger et al., 2013).
Another problem with fMRI scans is that it is difficult
to estimate what the magnitude of the effect of a cer-
tain finding is. In other words, if it can be assumed
that a certain brain function correlates with a concept
such as “aggression,” and that it seems reasonable that
there is a causal link, then to what extent was that
particular brain activity responsible for the increase in
aggression? It is also always important when interpret-
ing a fMRI scan of an individual to know who made
up the control group. To be able to decide if a person
is deviating, we first need to establish what is normal.
There is a great variety in brains, and too little
research has been done into the question of how to
create a sensible control group to compare with indi-
viduals. This limits the diagnostic applications (De
Kogel & Westgeest, 2015). Finally, we have to take
into account the influence of medication. Many peo-
ple who undergo scanning take certain psychophar-
maceuticals which influence what is visible on the
scans made (Schleim & Rosier, 2009). Jelicic and
Merckelbach point out in this context to the second
forensic relevance of medication: scans could be easily
manipulated by people involved in criminal justice by
taking psychotropic substances (2007).
In addition, the concepts being examined in neurosci-
ence could be criticized. The neuroscientific method
attempts to establish correlations between concepts that
are psychological in nature, such as “aggression” or
“control,” and cognitive functions, such as “attention
control” or “impulse control,” and finally brain regions
and circuits (Haseleger et al., 2013). The existence of
these concepts rests on assumptions, however. If a par-
ticular brain activity can be correlated with a certain
concept, this does not say much about the meaning that
must be ascribed to this activity. This activity may be
responsible for a range of other processes, or perhaps
the concept that is hypothesized to be a dependent vari-
able is incorrect. Finally, it can be pointed out that psy-
chological research has shown that experts who have to
interpret brain scans often make false-positive conclu-
sions (Jelicic & Merckelbach, 2007). In other words, if
the experts participating in an experiment hear that the
scan they are to be given is from a “sick” individual,
they tend to see deviations more often than when they
see the same scans without being told that something is
wrong with the scanned subject. This is a real danger in
forensic settings, when someone has committed an
offense that needs an explanation. This discussion
matches the finding that American courts exclude neu-
roimaging evidence because they fail to meet general
admissibility standards, there is an insufficient causal
link between the brain abnormality presented and its
ability to negate the specific legal concept, the scan is
temporally irrelevant, as it was administered at a date
far removed from the offense; and the modality pro-
posed is not clinically reliable in diagnosing the condi-
tion at issue (Edersheim et al., 2012).
In brief, given the above-mentioned restrictions, it
can be concluded that the clinical applications of neu-
roscientific research is still limited, even after 30 years
of comprehensive studies. For the explanatory diag-
nostics in forensic psychiatry, there is the additional
problem that it is not clear how a possible dysfunction
is expressed in a particular action (choice to act), such
as a crime (Van Marle, 2009).
Admitted, the traditional method of behavioral
explanatory diagnostics is liable to its fair share of
criticism, as frequently expressed by legal psycholo-
gists. In a general sense, the step from research data
to an explanatory and individualized story still lacks
scientific support. However, that is specifically the
step that traditionally brought behavioral science and
criminal justice together, as both disciplines are asked
to form judgements in individual cases. Brain scans
and instruments score better with important scientific
aspects such as reproducibility, but they lack the rele-
vant translation to the court. That applies for now to
all criminal justice-relevant concepts, the absence of
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intention or accountability which cannot be validated,
the assessment of danger, sensitivity to punishment or
treatment, etc. Risk assessment research has shown in
the meantime that the combination of a scientifically
supported instrument with a clinical interpretation
based on knowledge about and experience with the
involved person led to the best “predictions” (De
Vogel, 2005). The embracing of “soft science” for
more relevant and harder results seems to be a direc-
tion that sets an example for forensic science.
Therefore, as neuroscientific information is most often
incorporated in the assessment of criminal responsi-
bility, it seems to be state of the art that the behav-
ioral experts which are used to do these
assessments—in conjunction with the neuroscientis-
t—integrate (the relevance of) the neuroscientific find-
ings in their interpretation and advice to the court.
Conclusion
In this article, by using the Dutch situation as an
example, we illustrate how the integration of criminal
law and neuroscience take different shapes and forms
within different legal frameworks. We started with a
discussion on the theoretical level, which is promoted
by neuroscientists who claim that the belief in free
will is an illusion and that this compels us to reform
criminal law, as well as three reactions to this position
that are predominant in the literature. We established
that the Dutch criminal justice and sanctioning system
already consist of a compromise between holding peo-
ple partly responsible for their actions and preventa-
tively sanctioning them for future actions to which
they may be predisposed because of their mental con-
dition. In addition to the nuanced dimensional
approach to criminal responsibility also the normative
approach which is taken toward that doctrine allows
for the integration of all relevant information.
Second, we turned the focus on the Dutch legal
practice. Here, neuroscientific input is increasingly
playing a role in answering concrete legal questions.
Although previous literature tentatively suggested
otherwise, we do not see any indications that this leads
more often to problems arising in proving “subjective”
doctrines, such as intent, guilt or premeditation.
Criminal responsibility remains the most suitable doc-
trine for the individual assessment of the suspect’s
determinism, whether founded in neurobiological ter-
minology or not. Neurosciences are incorporated in
establishing abnormalities that would diminish
accountability instead of rendering anyone unaccount-
able. As it is now a question of abnormality or
psychopathology, an advantage of the Dutch system
may be that diminished responsibility does not only
lead to mitigation of the sentence, but also opens up
the possibility of placement in specialized treat-
ment facilities.
Now that neuroscience in the Netherlands seems to
have been given a comparable place to the traditional
behavioral science contribution in court in assessing
criminal responsibility, it can be expected that it will
be similarly given a role in supportive decisions in
criminal law, such as assessing danger or sensitivity to
treatment, whether mandatory or not. Now, with the
same arguments to criticize the traditional behavioral
science input, neuroscience will also need to be pre-
pared to have its value (validity) scrutinized in court.
Where the traditional input of behavioral experts is
considered soft science, the hardness of neuroscientific
contributions also appears overestimated. In addition,
there is a lack of clarity and utility for forming a
judgement about the individual defendant. We feel
that an integrative behavioral science approach inter-
preting neuroscientific information combined with
soft science methods is the most appropriate course to
take. Experience from risk assessment research sug-
gests that this integrative approach serves not only the
utility in court but also the validity. Moreover, it miti-
gates the hardness of the conclusions, paying more
respect to the individual behind the offense.
In short, especially the typical Dutch criminal
responsibility doctrine, allowing for diminished
responsibility because of a mental disorder, seems to
render a framework in which neuroscientific informa-
tion may be easily integrated. An empirical look at
Dutch case law seems to confirm that assumption.
Moreover, the common practice of forensic assess-
ment in the Netherlands also allows for an integrative
approach. As criminal justice systems are shaped on
the basis of long legal traditions and temporal devel-
opments, the eventuality of these feature give no cause
to complacency. Also in the Netherlands, the
described debate is not silenced by this situation and
much is still to gain in the integration of neuroscience
and law. However, we hope to have demonstrated that
national perspectives may inform the international
debate and that legal comparison may aid forwarding
the discussions on integrating neuroscientific informa-
tion in other criminal justice systems worldwide.
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